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Chapter 9: Exploring the Boundaries of Law: On the Is-Ought 
Distinction in Jellinek and Kelsen [last draft version] 
 
Bart van Klink & Oliver W. Lembcke 
 
1. Facts and Norms 
 
Of the three dominant strands in legal philosophy – natural law theory, 
interactionism and positivism –, legal positivism at least in its normative variant,1 is 
the least inclined to establish interconnections between the spheres of Is and 
Ought. That, of course, raises questions about the autonomy of law and the 
relation between law and other social domains and, as a consequence, about the 
relation between the science of law and other scientific disciplines. According to 
many legal positivists, it is the law, and the law only, that determines what counts 
as a valid legal norm and what is prescribed by this legal norm, not some 
                                                 
1 In contrast to descriptive legal positivism, normative legal positivism (as advocated by, for instance, Hart 
and Kelsen) does not reduce law to a social fact but takes account of the normativity of law (see Andrei 
Marmor, ‘Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral’ (2006) 26(4) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 683).  
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regularity or reasonable expectation in interactional patterns among people, or 
some dictate of reason. Vice versa, legal norms do not tell us anything about how 
things are in nature or in social reality; they solely prescribe what ought to be the 
case from a legal point of view. The law pictures a world wished for, not the world 
as it is. Indeed, it is the actual, or at least potential, discrepancy between law and 
reality that enables law to uphold a normative stance towards reality and to 
demand conformity to its norms.  
 In German and Germanophone legal theory, Kelsen’s normative legal 
positivism has been very influential. Both on methodological and ideology-critical 
grounds, Hans Kelsen defends a rigorous Is-Ought distinction. ‘This opposition 
between “Is” and “Ought” is a fundamental element of the methods used in the 
humanities in general and of the scientific study of state and law in particular.’2 
According to him, the spheres of Is and Ought have to be separated strictly 
because otherwise the science of law would have no distinct and distinctive object 
of research. By focusing on the formal aspects of law and the structure of the legal 
system, he attempts to ‘purify’ his theory of law from all external, non-legal 
influences as much as possible. Kelsen acknowledges that law can be studied 
both from a normative-legal and an empirical perspective, but denies that these 
things can be done at the same time, that is from a unified perspective. In his view, 
the science of law constitutes an autonomous discipline that does not need to 
incorporate insights from other disciplines. On the contrary, the combination of 
                                                 
2 Hans Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses 
vom Staat und Recht (Mohr Siebeck 1922) 75; our translation. 
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methods from various disciplines would, he fears, result in a confusion of what has 
to be studied: law as a collection of norms or as a part of social reality. Moreover, 
if these spheres would be conflated, the law would lose its critical distance from 
reality and would become a mere tool in the hands of the powerful.  
Interestingly, one of Kelsen’s well-respected, but largely forgotten, predecessors, 
the Austrian legal scholar Georg Jellinek, saw no evil in connecting facts and 
norms. Indeed, in his notion of the normative he tried to capture the normative 
force of the factual (‘die normative Kraft des Faktischen’). He believed the factual 
state of affairs could give rise to legitimate and legally relevant normative 
expectations. Because of the interconnection between facts and norms in law, he 
argued, contrary to Kelsen, that the state can only be understood meaningfully, if 
other, extra-legal, but still legally relevant perspectives are taken into account in 
addition to the legal perspective.  
 In our contribution we intend to get a better grasp on the relation between Is 
and Ought in law and its implications for the autonomy of law and the possibility 
(or even necessity) of interdisciplinary research. We focus on the debate between 
Jellinek and Kelsen because both scholars have attempted, each in their own way, 
to secure the autonomy of law as an autonomous discipline. Their respective 
theories constitute strong positions in the legal-philosophical literature on the 
scientific foundation of the study of law.3 The search for such a foundation may 
                                                 
3 In our chapter we do not discuss contemporary positivist theories, such as those of Hart and Raz, which 
already have received a lot of scholarly attention (see, for instance, Gerald J Postuma, A Treatise of Legal 
Philosophy and General Jurisprudence: Volume 11: Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The 
Common Law World (Springer 2011) 261-399). Moreover, where Kelsen has laid out a normative account of 
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seem to be, to some contemporary legal scholars, outdated, but in our view it still 
remains relevant to ask what makes the study of law scientific and how it relates to 
other disciplines. We take Jellinek’s general theory of the state as a starting point, 
because it offers a good basis to reflect on the interrelationship of the factual and 
normative side of political order and the role law plays in connecting these two 
sides. Thus, Jellinek holds an exceptional position within normative legal 
positivism that is in line with the contemporary trend toward interdisciplinary 
research.4 However attractive it may be in this respect, is it a strong position, or is 
it a threat to the autonomy of law from the perspective of legal science as Kelsen 
claims? And, if so, would that necessarily be a bad thing? With Kelsen, we believe 
that some kind of ‘border control’ between scientific disciplines is necessary. 
Otherwise the specific access to reality which a discipline offers gets lost, together 
with the specific methods used in order to verify its truth claims. An unregulated 
‘mashup’ of perspectives may result in a set of truth claims which are not 
necessarily compatible and cannot be verified in consistent way.5 However, we 
consider Kelsen’s attempt to purify the science of law to be too rigid and ultimately 
                                                                                                                                                    
law that more radically departs from empirical considerations than, for instance, Hart’s notion of the rule of 
recognition (HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3th edn, Clarendon Press 2012)) and Raz’s sources thesis 
(Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Clarendon Press 1979)), Jellinek has 
developed a unique ‘psychological’ approach that attempts to reconcile the is-ought distinction.  
4 Sanne Taekema and Bart van Klink, ‘On the Border: Limits and Possibilities of Interdisciplinary Research’ 
in Bart van Klink and Sanne Taekema (eds), Law and Method: Interdisciplinary Research into Law (Mohr 
Siebeck 2011) 7.  
5 Ibid 31. 
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not convincing. We think it is worthwhile, therefore, to revisit the work of Jellinek, 
which has been standing in the shadow of his illustrious successor for too long, 
both in Germany and elsewhere. Kelsen’s criticism, in turn, helps us to identify 
weak points and challenges in Jellinek’s theory, such as its exclusive focus on the 
nation state.  
 Firstly, we will describe Jellinek’s ‘two-sided theory of the state’ and we will 
elucidate his notion of the normative force of the factual as an example of 
Jellinek’s attempt to transcend the Is-Ought distinction (section 2).6 Secondly, we 
will discuss Kelsen’s criticism of Jellinek’s multilayered conception of the state, 
which, according to Kelsen, is based on an impermissible conflation of Is and 
Ought (section 3). Thirdly, we will compare and evaluate the two opposing views 
on the relation between facts and norms in law (section 4). Finally, after comparing 
the two approaches, we will indicate how interdisciplinary research can be helpful 
in addressing the problems and questions the two approaches are faced with 
(section 5). 
 
2. The Two Sides of the State  
 
In the architecture of Jellinek’s General Theory of the State (Allgemeine 
Staatslehre), the so-called ‘two-sided theory of the state’ (‘Zwei-Seiten-Lehre’) 
plays a constitutive role. In his view, the state has to be analysed from two 
                                                 
6 This section is to a large extent derived from Oliver W Lembcke, ‘Staats(rechts)lehre oder 
Rechts(staats)lehre? Zum Rechtspositivismus bei Jellinek und Kelsen’ in Rainer Schmidt (ed), 
Rechtspositivismus: Ursprung und Kritik (Nomos 2014) 98 ff.   
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perspectives in conjunction. Firstly, from the perspective of social theory, the state 
is studied as an organized state of affairs (‘status’) in society.7 Secondly, from the 
perspective of the general constitutional law doctrine (‘allgemeine 
Staatsrechtslehre’), the state is conceived as a legal institution.8 Both perspectives 
are necessary, because through the use of their own research methods they each 
capture the state in one of its manifestations. According to Jellinek, the state is a 
complex research object that calls for an equally complex approach in which 
various perspectives are combined.9 This perspectivist approach has to be in 
accordance with modern methodological requirements and has to respect, for 
instance, the distinction between Is-statements and Ought-statements – albeit, not 
in the rigorous fashion of neo-Kantian theory (as advocated by Kelsen, see section 
3). In neo-Kantian theory, it is the research method chosen by the researchers in 
line with their subjective knowledge interests, that constitutes the object of 
research.10 Jellinek, on the other hand, holds on to the objective existence of the 
                                                 
7 Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (3rd edn, Dr. Max Gehlen Verlag 1966) 129-379. 
8 Ibid 383-795. 
9 Ibid 74.  
10 For an analysis of contemporary neo-Kantian theory and its relevance for the humaniora, see Gangolf 
Hübinger, ‘Staatstheorie und Politik als Wissenschaft im Kaiserreich: Georg Jellinek, Otto Hintze, Max 
Weber’ in Hans Maier et al. (eds), Politik, Philosophie, Praxis: Festschrift für Wilhelm Hennis zum 65. 
Geburtstag (Klett-Cotta 1988) 143. On Jellinek’s methodology in particular, see Oliver Lepsius, ‘Georg 
Jellineks Methodenlehre im Spiegel der zeitgenössischen Erkenntnistheorie’ in Stanley L Paulson and Martin 
Schulte (eds), Georg Jellinek (Mohr Siebeck 2000) 329 ff. and Oliver Lepsius, ‘Die Zwei-Seiten-Lehre des 
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object, which gives way to a multitude of perspectives that have to be taken into 
account by the researcher.11  
 Building on the objective existence of the state, Jellinek distinguishes two 
different functions that are fulfilled by the state and that, even though they depend 
on each other, are incommensurable, namely the creation and maintenance of 
both the social order and the legal order. However, due to the methodological 
dualism of his two-sided theory, he does not consider the state to be simply the 
unity of these functions.12 Jellinek strongly warns against a fusion of perspectives, 
because that would neglect the specific character of these domains:  
The denial and obliteration of the distinction explained here is the cause of 
the most fatal errors that persist to the present day. The legal nature of the 
state and its institutions is constantly confused with its social reality. Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                                    
Staates’ in Andreas Anter (ed), Die normative Kraft des Faktischen: Das Staatsverständnis Georg Jellineks 
(Nomos 2004) 78 ff. 
11 As Kersten writes: ’The object of knowledge determines in advance the knowledge perspective, the 
consciousness aiming for knowledge just follows the object’ (Jens Kersten, ‘Georg Jellineks System: Eine 
Einleitung’ in Jens Kersten (ed), Georg Jellinek: System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte (reprint 2nd edn, 
first published 1905, Mohr Siebeck 2011) 25; our translation) 7.    
12 In today’s vocabulary of Systems Theory, one could say that the state is not so much the unity of the social 
and the legal order, but the unity of their difference. A system-theoretical reconstruction of Jellinek’s two-
sided theory of the state can be found in André Brodocz, ‘Georg Jellinek und die zwei Seiten der Verfassung’ 
in Andreas Anter (ed), Die normative Kraft des Faktische: Das Staatsverständnis Georg Jellineks (Nomos 
2004) 153. 
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that there are various ways of acquiring knowledge about the state so far 
has not been clearly understood at all.13  
Consequently, the unity of state does not, according to Jellinek, follow directly from 
the object itself. There is no immediate access to the thing called state. Moreover, 
the state, as an object of knowledge, has no unitary structure, either as an 
empirical phenomenon or as a theoretical construction. The point is to grasp ‘the 
internal connection between the disciplines that both represent the general theory 
of the state’ and to avoid ‘the subsequent error’ that you could capture the 
complexity of state with only one side of the theory while ignoring the other side.14 
 Seen from the perspective of social science, the political order – or in a 
continental European perspective: ‘the state’ – springs like every association from 
an agreement of wills or, in other words, from the perception and acceptance of 
the order it is able to establish. Contrary to every other association, this agreement 
of wills applies to the sovereign order of society. The state constitutes a sovereign 
order, according to Jellinek, because it can enforce its will against every other 
social organization, even unconditionally. It is an ‘original’ power that, legally 
speaking, cannot be derived from any other power.15 As an instutionalized power, 
                                                 
13 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (n 7) 138-39 (see also 74); our translation. 
14 Ibid 12; our translation.  
15 Ibid 180. 
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the state demonstrates its sovereign character by imposing a hierarchical structure 
on society.16 Jellinek defines the social side of the state as follows:  
The state is the unitary association of resident persons with original 
sovereign power.17  
He contrasts this social conception of the state with the legal conception: 
As a legal conception, the state is (…) the corporation of a resident people 
with original sovereign power.18  
These definitions seem very similar. In what respect exactly does the legal 
conception of the state differ from the social conception? Constitutive for the 
subjective dimension of the agreement of wills are the elements ‘unitary 
association’ (‘Verbandseinheit’) and ‘persons’ (‘Menschen’), and these are 
replaced by elements necessary for the objective dimension of legal attribution: 
‘corporation’ (‘Körperschaft’) and ‘people’ (‘Volk’) respectively. The empirical 
category of efficacy, which concerns the effects of law in reality, is turned into the 
legal concept of validity on which basis legal consequences can be attached to 
                                                 
16 A comparison between the related concepts of power and sovereignty in Jellinek and Weber can be found 
in Andreas Anter, ‘Max Weber und Georg Jellinek: Wissenschaftliche Beziehung, Affinitäten und 
Divergenzen’ in Stanley L Paulson and Martin Schulte (eds), Georg Jellinek (Mohr Siebeck 2000) 67. 
17 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (n 7) 180 ff, our translation. Original text: ‘Der Staat ist die mit 
ursprünglicher Herrschermacht ausgerüstete Verbandseinheit seßhafter Menschen.’ 
18 Our translation, orginal text: ‘Als Rechtsbegriff ist der Staat (…) die mit ursprünglicher Herrschermacht 
ausgerüstete Körperschaft eines seßhaften Volkes.’ More specifically, it concerns ‘the regional corperation 
equipped with original sovereign power’ (‘die mit ursprünglicher Herrschermacht ausgestattete 
Gebietskörperschaft’; Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (n 7) 183). 
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factual occurences. A decision ‘on behalf of the people’ usually has nothing to do 
with the people as an empirical entity, but derives its legitimacy in a mediated way 
from ‘the people’ as an object of attribution, so that social conflicts can be solved 
by means of legally binding decisions. Although the losing party in court 
proceedings won’t be inclined to agree with the concrete outcome of the case it 
will, generally speaking, be convinced that courts decide in accordance with the 
law and that therefore their decisions have to be complied with. Convictions of this 
kind have to be presupposed by the legal concept of the state – and, as a 
consequence, by the law – and legal validity is founded on them: ‘(…) the law 
must always proceed from the actual state of affairs, because it – however it may 
be drafted – has the goal of being applied to actual state of affairs.’19 In the 
application of norms to facts, the law is able to to create the internal connection 
between the social and the legal conception of the state.20  
 According to Jellinek, law is the concrete expression of the interrelation 
between facticity and normativity that characterizes the state in general. Therefore, 
he approaches law in his General Theory of the State from both a legal and social 
scientific point of view. In his view, legal norms cannot be understood properly 
when they are reduced to their ought-capacity: ‘They owe their continued 
existence over time, their efficacy and their concrete shape and form to causes 
which cannot only be ascribed to the normative sphere.’21 As a product of the 
                                                 
19 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (n 7) 162; our translation.  
20 Jens Kersten, Georg Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre (Mohr Siebeck 2000) 266-301. 
21 Lepsius, ‘Die Zwei-Seiten-Lehre des Staates’ (n 10) 73; our translation. 
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human will, law will remain dependent on the shared conviction that what we are 
dealing with is law. However, where does that conviction come from? In his notion 
of the ‘normative force of the factual’, which plays a central role in his theory of 
law, Jellinek tries to find an answer to this question.22 
 The phrase ‘normative force of the factual’ is ambiguous. Does the factual 
have the power to create law? Or, vice versa, is the normative capable of 
establishing facts? Writing about the development of law, Jellinek offers both 
interpretations. Thus, the ‘normative force of the factual’ is a statement not so 
much about the validity as about the genesis of law,23 which nonetheless affects 
its validity. Normative expectations arise from factual relationships in a similar way 
as customary law, in which a certain custom, habit or established practice (usus) 
in due time is accompanied by the opinion, widely held in the legal community, that 
what is usually done, ought to be done legally speaking (opinio iuris). Jellinek 
attributes to custom or habit (‘Gewohnheit’) the transformative potential to elevate 
the factual to the level of the normal.24 The force of habit is a normative force that 
eventually turns normality into normativity. What is done normally becomes, in 
                                                 
22 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (n 7) 337-44. On the social dimension of his theory of law, see also 
Andreas Anter, ‘Georg Jellineks wissenschaftliche Politik. Positionen, Kontexte, Wirkungslinien’ (1998) 
PVS 39(3) 503, 520-23, Kersten, Georg Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre (n 21) 364-375, and Peter 
Landau, ‘Rechtsgeltung bei Georg Jellinek’ in Stanley L Paulson and Martin Schulte (eds), Georg Jellinek 
(Mohr Siebeck 2000) 299. 
23 Landau (n 22) 302. 
24 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (n 7) 338 refers in this context to the development of children and the 
phenomenon of fashion, and also specifically to customary law (Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (n 7) 339). 
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daily life and in the minds of people, the norm. It is therefore perfectly possible, as 
Jellinek argues, that a certain distribution of power in society which is seen as 
oppressive and unjust at some later point in history, once had a legal character, 
not so much because it was enforced through power, but because it was 
recognized as law also by those who were oppressed by it.25 
 Law is what is considered to be appropriate, or acceptable, in the social 
context of the time. Appropriateness or acceptability (‘Angemessenheit’) is 
promoted by processes of institutionalization that consolidate or stabilize various 
cultural patterns, ideas or templates.26 These processes cannot be consciously 
controlled or influenced by people. They emerge in social interaction in daily life. 
From this perspective the normativity of law neither follows from its rightness nor 
from its rationality. It is the other way around: the long-winded and complex 
process of transforming normality into normativity leads eventually – through the 
normative force of the factual – to the recognition that what is accepted as the 
norm is not only normal but also right and rational.27 Because of the duration of 
this transformation process, the validity of law is secured for a certain period of 
time. However, for the same reason, the law may be challenged, since convictions 
                                                 
25 Ibid 343. 
26 See James G March and Johan P Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics 
(The Free Press 1989) chapter 2, who give an analysis of how rules are internalised through 
institutionalization, which on many points is very similar to Jellinek’s description. 
27 This transformation process is not limited to individual norms or separate areas of law but includes 
basically the whole legal order (Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (n 7) 340). 
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on normality and normativity may change. No legal order is resistant to change, 
sometimes even radical change.  
The interrelationship between the origin and the validity of law, established 
through the normative force of the factual, can also be turned around in a ‘factual 
force of the normative.’28 According to Jellinek, the normative exerts its factual 
force when legal subjects believe that there is a higher normativity, contained in 
natural law, that transcends the enacted law and that may amend and improve it.29 
Through the conviction that what is, ought to be, a stable order is created, much in 
the same way as customary law described above. The counterpart of this process 
is the human capability to imagine how the political order should be constituted 
legally. It is the achievement of the natural law tradition to have developed a rich 
collection of principles for the design of a just legal constitution.30  
 
3. The State as a Legal Order  
 
In the introduction to his early work Fundamental Problems of the Statutory Law 
Doctrine Kelsen31 pays tribute to his respected predecessor Jellinek by referring to 
him as his ‘unparalleled master’ (‘unerreichter Meister’). In what follows, however, 
                                                 
28 Kersten, Georg Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre (n 20) 372. 
29 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (n 7) 344 ff. 
30 Landau (n 22) 303. 
31 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre: entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze (2nd edn, 
Scientia 1960) XIII; our translation. 
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Kelsen does not build on the teachings of his predecessor in a friendly 
hermeneutic way; instead he offers, in this and subsequent works, a frontal attack 
on what he considers to be the dominant theory of the state and constitutional law 
in his time.32 One could say that Kelsen uses Jellinek as an avil upon which he 
could hammer and shape his own theory, the pure theory of law (Reine 
Rechtslehre).33 Kelsen critizes, firstly, Jellinek’s concept of the State as the unity 
of the social and the legal dimension, which are connected but at the same time 
irreducible to each other and, secondly, the connection that he establishes 
between a legal and a sociological understanding of the state and, by implication, 
between law and society.34 Below we will try to deal with these points separately 
as much as possible. Even though they all are raise questions about the 
methodological and ideological presuppositions of Jellinek’s theory.  
 As a matter of principle, Kelsen claims that if an object is approached from 
two different perspectives, it does not constitute the same object. So when Jellinek 
distinguishes two different sides of the state, the social and the legal, these two 
sides cannot possibly refer to the same thing, since they are studied by means of 
two different disciplines. Using the conceptual and methodological tools specific to 
                                                 
32 Kersten, Georg Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre (n 20) 170 speaks of an ‘anti-reception’. 
33 Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses vom 
Staat und Recht (n 2) 115; our translation, is quite explicit about his aim when he writes: ‘Together with 
Jellinek’s theory [that is, his two-sided theory of the state] the legal doctrine should go down.’ 
34 Moreover, Kelsen critizes Jellinek’s theory of self-commitment which assumes that the state restricts its 
power voluntarily by means of law. For a discussion of Kelsen’s criticism of Jellinek, see Kersten, Georg 
Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre (n 20) 171 ff. 
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each discipline, social theory and legal doctrine construe different objects of 
knowledge that confusingly in common parlance fly under the same flag of the 
state.35 According to Kelsen, Jellinek’s two-sided theory of the state eventually 
boils down to a univocal, consistently legal theory since Jellinek is not able to 
distinguish the two conceptions of the state in a convincing way. They can only be 
differentiated, as Kelsen argues, if it can be demonstrated that they serve different 
purposes. However, the two definitions of the state provided by Jellinek (see 
section 2) differ only in minor respects. How exactly should one differentiate 
between the state as a ‘unitary association’ and the state as a ‘corporation’ and 
between ‘persons’ and ‘people’ residing in the state? In both definitions Jellinek 
appeals to an ‘original sovereign power’. Only from a legal perspective, the state 
can be attributed this kind of power, provided that one is willing to acknowledge it 
as the highest legal order by accepting its basic norm.36 As a social instutition, the 
state cannot seriously claim to have power ‘from origin’ and to have control over all 
other social associations. 
                                                 
35 In section 3, this point is elaborated in more detail. 
36 In earlier works, Kelsen (Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts. 
Beitrag zu einer reinen Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck 1920) 94 and Kelsen, Der soziologische und der 
juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses vom Staat und Recht (n 2) 94 ff) referred 
to the ‘originary norm’ (‘Ursprungsnorm’), what later became known as the ‘basic norm’ (‘Grundnorm’, 
which notion was already used by Kelsen (Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: 
Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses vom Staat und Recht (n 2) 100)). 
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 In Kelsen’s pure theory of law, state and law are identified.37 As Kelsen 
argues, the state is ‘the personification of a legal order.’38 Irrespective of how they 
are created and by whom they are created, legal norms owe their validity to the 
state and not to society. Kelsen considers the state to be a ‘special form of 
society’, ‘social unity’ or a ‘legal organization’ to which all legal norms can be 
traced back, whether they are produced by state officials or by members of an 
association. Taken together, the legal norms of a given legal order build a 
hierarchical structure (or ‘Stufenbau’), consisting of different levels of norms and 
norm applications, starting from the basic norm, moving down to statutes, 
governmental regulations, court decisions, contracts, and so on, and ending in the 
factual execution of a legal command (e.g., the imprisonment of a criminal by a 
police officer).39 Because the norms belonging to a given legal order owe their 
validity ultimately to the basic norm, the basic norm brings unity in the diversity of 
existing norms. This unity makes it possible to describe the legal order at hand as 
a coherent set of legal sentences that do not contradict each other.40  
 Seen from a legal perspective, sovereign power is not a capacity that the 
state possesses independently from, outside or above the legal order: 
‘Sovereignty cannot transcend the legal order, because it is only a feature of the 
                                                 
37 For a more detailed description of Kelsen’s theory, see Lembcke (n 6) 103 ff. 
38 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Anders Wedberg (tr), Russell & Russell 1973) 197. 
39 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (Max Knight (tr), translated from the second (revised and enlarged) 
German edition, University of California Press 1970) 221 ff.  
 
40 Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (n 39) 205-08. 
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legal order.’41 The state exists only to the extent that it expresses its will through 
the form of law, which derives its content from society. From a social perspective, 
the state has no ‘originary’ power to dominate all other social associations. Yet, by 
attributing omnipotence to the state Jellinek’s two-sided theory serves an 
ideological purpose, which, according to Kelsen, is typical for constitutional law 
doctrine in general and one which it shares with theology:  
[B]y doing so, the power of the state is increased; and this constitutional law 
doctrine has always considered to be its main task – though it is no 
theoretical but a practical-political function–, like it is indeed the task of 
theology not so much to acquire knowledge about God, but rather to 
increase his power.’42  
A second recurring theme in his critique is what Kelsen considers to be Jellinek’s 
methodological syncretism. In his two-sided theory of the state, Jellinek offers two 
different perspectives on the state that, though separated in the way they have to 
be studied, are connected on crucial moments, in particular in his account of the 
validity of law, the revolutionary breakdown or creation of legal order, and the 
limitations to state power. In Kelsen’s view, the social and the legal perspective 
can never be connected because they make use of different research methods 
                                                 
41 Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts. Beitrag zu einer reinen 
Rechtslehre (n 36) 36; our translation. 
42 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (2nd edn reprint, Verlag Dr. Max Gehlen 1966) 100-01; our 
translation.  
309 
 
and, as a consequence, deal with different objects of knowledge.43 On the one 
hand, the state is studied as an empirical phenomenon (or social institution) and, 
on other hand, the state is conceived of as a legal construction (that is, a set of 
norms). Kelsen denies that there is such a thing as the state ‘as such’. The state 
has no objective existence independent of our research methods, but is construed 
differently from different scientific perspectives. By conflating a legal and a social 
perspective on the state a scientific hybrid is created or, as Kelsen puts it, a 
‘grotesque mythical creature: half legal order, half natural being.’ 44 In his view, 
Jellinek’s cardinal sin is that he fuses and confuses the domains of Is and Ought 
and, as a result, unscientific political preferences are smuggled into his theory. 
 In his pure theory of law, Kelsen tries to construe a critical-scientific 
conception of law which, because it is cleansed from metaphysical and empirical 
references, safeguards the autonomy of law.45 He seeks to provide a solid 
scientific foundation for the science of law in order to secure its position among 
other sciences, in particular the natural sciences which threaten to become the 
dominant and only acceptable form of ‘true’ science. For that purpose, the 
question has to be answered what is typical or unique about the way the science 
of law understands its object and how it differs from other understandings. Building 
                                                 
43 As Kelsen (Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des 
Verhältnisses vom Staat und Recht (n 2) 116; our translation) firmly states: ‘The identity of the object of 
knowledge is conditioned by the idendity of the research method!’  
44 Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts. Beitrag zu einer reinen 
Rechtslehre (n 36) 210; our translation. 
45 For a more detailed description of Kelsen’s methodological views, see Lembcke (n 6) 109 ff. 
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on the neo-Kantian axiom that, in the humanities in general Is and Ought are 
strictly separated,46 Kelsen argues that the phenomenon of law can be studied 
from two different perspectives: either how it Ought to be (Sollen) or how it Is 
(Sein). These two perspectives correspond with two different disciplines from 
which law can be studied: respectively, a normative science of law that establishes 
deductively which rules are valid, and an explanatory sociology of law that 
determines inductively a certain regularity for which it tries to find a causal 
explanation. Thus, in Kelsen’s view, the science of law is a normative and 
deductive science of value, like ethics and logic. However, as a normative science, 
the science of law does not prescribe what ought to be law, but only describes 
what, according to the conditions set in the law itself, has to count as law. In other 
words, it is only concerned with the ‘the Is of Ought’ (or ‘Sein des Sollens’). 47 On 
the other hand, the sociology of law, like other branches of sociology is a science 
of reality, and conforms more generally to the methodological practices of the 
natural sciences. It is equally possible and legitimate to study law from both 
perspectives, but not at the same time. According to Kelsen, it is the aim of the 
science of law to describe the set of valid legal norms in a certain territory at a 
certain time, irrespective of their ethical value and empirical effects.  
                                                 
46 Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses vom 
Staat und Recht (n 2) 75. On the influence of the neo-Kantian epistemology on Kelsen, see Horst Dreier, 
Rechtslehre, Staatsoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen (2nd edn, Nomos 1990) 56-90. 
47 Lembcke (n 6) 103 ff. 
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 Following the dichotomy of facts and norms, he argues that the validity of 
law can only be established on normative grounds. In his view, as indicated 
earlier, a norm is a valid legal norm, if it can be demonstrated that a higher legal 
norm has authorized the creation of this norm on a lower level in the hierarchy of 
norms that builds the legal system. Ultimately, all legal norms belonging to the 
same legal system can be traced back to the basic norm. The basic norm holds 
that all norms that follow from the historically first constitution of a legal order are 
legal norms. It is a ‘hypothesis’48 or ‘assumption’49 which makes the scientific 
description of law in the form of legal sentences possible. Kelsen does not deny 
that the law may draw its norms from various non-legal sources, such as morality, 
religion or custom. However, these norms are not legal norms because religion, 
morality, or custom prescribe them, but because they can be validated by 
reference to other, and higher, legal norms and, ultimately to the basic norm. From 
a legal perspective, as Kelsen claims, it does not matter at all where the law 
derives its content from.50 He considers Jellinek’s concept of the ‘normative force 
of the factual’ to be a purely ‘historical-psychological notion’ without any legal 
relevance.51 It merely provides an empirical explanation of how certain norms 
                                                 
48 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Mit einem Anhang: Das Problem der Gerechtigkeit (2nd edn reprint, 
Mohr Siebeck 1976) 47 and Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts 
(2nd edn, Mohr Siebeck 1928) 97. 
49 Dreier (n 46) 45. 
50 Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses vom 
Staat und Recht (n 2) 100. 
51 Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre: entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze (n 31) 9. 
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have become accepted in social interaction, in a similar way to customs, and does 
not explain why these norms have to be considered valid legal norms. From the 
fact that something used to be done (or is expected to be done), it does not follow 
logically that this should be done. 
 Kelsen accuses Jellinek of mixing up the validity of law and its 
effectiveness: ‘Jellinek tries to find the specific existence of the norms, their 
validity, in their efficacy!’ 52 In Kelsen’s view, legal norms are valid as long as the 
legal system to which they belong is, by and large, effective, but not because of its 
effectiveness. In other words, the efficacy of the legal system is a conditio per 
quam and no conditio sine qua non for the law’s validity.53 If one makes the validity 
of law dependent on the social acceptance of the norms by the majority of people 
in society, as Jellinek seems to do, one could only establish retroactively that a 
norm is a legal norm. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove scientifically that 
a norm has been accepted by the majority. In fact, as Kelsen argues, the 
presumption of social acceptance is a fiction, which, in its turn, is based on the 
fiction that people know the law, which in most cases is obviously not the case.54 If 
the validity of law would depend on social acceptance, the science of law could no 
longer fulfil its task of describing the legal system as a unified whole, because the 
various legal norms may be accepted to different degrees by different people. 
                                                 
52 Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses vom 
Staat und Recht (n 2) 119; our translation. 
53 See also Dreier (n 46) 122. 
54 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Mit einem Anhang: Das Problem der Gerechtigkeit (n 48) 363. 
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Moreover, actors in legal practice, such as judges, must have an objective criterion 
to identify the law, not some subjective psychological notion.  
 By combining normative and factual perspectives in his general theory of 
the state Jellinek has, according to Kelsen, abondoned the legal-scientific 
method.55 One has to accept, as Simmel stated, that science is necessarily limited 
and can never encompass the whole of reality.56 If one wants to acquire 
consistent, that is non-contradictory knowledge of the law, one can accept only 
one system of norms as valid. Everytime an appeal is made to social, or ‘“real-life” 
knowledge’, Kelsen suspects that the legal perspective is traded in for the political 
perspective.57 In particular, he is concerned that Jellinek’s two-sided theory of the 
state would give way to a ‘double constitutional law’ (‘Doppelstaatsrecht’) which in 
fact would constitute a constitutional law for the most powerful. 58 With reference to 
extraordinary circumstances, the ruler could decide to overrule the rule of law at 
any time and put his will in its place.59 In his view, science should not engage itself 
                                                 
55 Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre: entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze (n 31) 490. 
56 Quoted in Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (n 42) 104.  
57 Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses vom 
Staat und Recht (n 2) 140. A similar criticism was raised against Eugen Ehrlich (see Bart van Klink, ‘Facts 
and Norms: The Unfinished Debate between Eugen Ehrlich and Hans Kelsen’ in Marc Hertogh (ed), Living 
Law: Rediscovering Eugen Ehrlich (Hart Publishing 2008) 239. On many points, Kelsen’s polemic with 
Jellinek resembles his discussion with Ehrlich.   
58 Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre: entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze (n 31) 434. 
59 For that reason, Kelsen (Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (n 42) 157) rejected the notion of ‘constitutional 
emergency law’ (‘Staatsnotrecht’). 
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with metaphysics and should therefore abandon the theological method of ‘double 
truth’. 60 Instead, science should aim for unity in the system it describes, in 
correspondence with the logical ideal of one truth. Accordingly, contemporary 
positivist science of law has to give up the concept of a meta-legal state. It should 
no longer operate with two perspectives on the state that, in Kelsen’s view, are 
entirely unrelated. That is not only a logical-epistemological requirement, as 
Kelsen stresses, but also an ‘ethical necessity’.61  
 
4. The Autonomy of Legal Science  
 
As scholars of constitutional law, Jellinek and Kelsen both tried to construe a 
scientific theory of law and state that could secure the autonomy of legal science. 
However, as will be apparent by now, they did so in very different, and in some 
respects even opposite ways. In this section we will sum up some of the main 
differences between these two theories. Jellinek’s and Kelsen’s theory of law and 
state differ from one another on the following five points: (1) the concept of the 
state; (2) the relation between law and state; (3) the validity of law; (4) the Is-
Ought distinction; and (5) the possibility of interdisciplinary research. Firstly, their 
concept of the state differs fundamentally. Jellinek considers the state to be a 
                                                 
60 Kelsen (Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des 
Verhältnisses vom Staat und Recht (n 2) 247) draws an anology to the religious beliefs in miracles. 
61 Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff: Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses vom 
Staat und Recht (n 2) 252. 
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specific institution which supersedes all other social institutions. In his view, it 
fulfils a double function: it provides society both with social and legal order. 
Correspondingly, the state, as an organisation of power, can be studied from two 
different perspectives: a social and a legal perspective. According to Jellinek both 
perspectives are needed to get a full grip on the state, but they can never be 
united in one all-compasing perspective because the methods used are not 
compatible. By applying norms to facts, law is capable of connecting the two sides 
of the state. Kelsen denies that the state, as a unified object of knowledge, can 
have two sides. According to him, the state only has one side from a legal 
perspective: the legal side, which coincides with the legal order. From this 
perspective, the state is nothing but a hierarchical structure of norms which owe 
their legal character to the presupposition of a highest norm, the basic, historically 
first norm. If one would try to take into account the other, social side of the state 
within the science of law, one would, in Kelsen’s view, jeopardize the unity of 
scientific knowledge. So, for Kelsen, law and the state are identical. Strictly 
speaking, he has no need for the concept of state at all.  
 Secondly, whereas Kelsen posits an identity between law and state (which 
renders the concept of state superfluous), Jellinek keeps these concepts separate. 
According to Jellinek, the state as a social institution invested with sovereign 
power precedes and has precedence over the legal order. In Kelsen’s ‘pure’ theory 
of law, however, law has primacy. Law is not necessarily connected to the state, 
since law can also exist outside of the confines of the nation-state, within the 
international sphere; Kelsen did not rule out the possibility of global law. Moreover, 
in his view, law takes care of its own creation, not some political entity above or 
316 
 
outside the legal order. Kelsen dismisses Jellinek’s dualism of law and state, not 
only on methodological grounds – as was noted before, the unity of scientific 
knowledge is at stake, – but also on ideological grounds: a ‘double’ constitutional 
law would give the powerful a permit to ignore the law whenever it is convenient. 
 Thirdly, opinions differ fundamentally on the question what constitutes the 
validity of law. Building on a strict separation between Is and Ought, Kelsen claims 
that only a higher legal norm can validate a legal norm on a lower level in the 
hierarchy of norms, making up the legal system. In this normativist account of legal 
validity, there always has to be a higher norm that authorizes the creation of the 
lower norm. It is the higher norm that decides on the validity of the lower norm; the 
lower norm has to be in accordance with the higher norm, that is, its application 
has to fall within the range of possible interpretations of the higher norm; if not, the 
lower norm has to be considered invalid. In the end, to prevent an infinite regress, 
one has to presuppose a highest norm, the basic norm, which, when accepted, 
validates all norms following from it. Facts cannot touch law’s validity; again, it is 
the law, and the law only, that takes care of its own creation. Jellinek, on the other 
hand, acknowledges that facts may be relevant in determining whether a legal 
norm is valid. With his notion of the normative force of the factual he captures the 
idea that an established practice may generate legal norms. If the majority of 
people accept a certain pattern of behaviour as normatively binding, the law 
cannot ignore that. Vice versa, a lack of acceptance may cause a legal norm to 
become obsolete. Kelsen is skeptical about the ability of science to establish 
whether a legal norm is accepted or not. Most people do not even know the law, 
he claims, so acceptance cannot be the ground of law’s validity. More principally, 
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the sheer acceptance of a norm, or a perceived regularity in behaviour, can never 
in itself render a norm legally valid, because that would involve an impermissible 
leap from Is to Ought. Consequently, Jellinek and Kelsen also give radically 
different accounts of fundamental changes in the law. For Jellinek, revolutionary 
ruptures in the law are a result of changed perceptions of legitimacy in society, 
whereas for Kelsen it is just a matter of exchanging one basic norm, which 
validated the old system of norms, for another basic norm, that gives legal status 
to new norms.   
 At the root of the debate between Jellinek and Kelsen lies, fourthly, a 
fundamental difference in epistemology or even ontology. As a logical precondition 
of knowledge in general and a ‘pure’ theory of law in particular, Kelsen posits a 
categorical distinction between Is and Ought. Following this distinction, a rough 
division in science can be made between scientific disciplines that describe how 
things are (the natural and the social sciences) and disciplines that establish what 
ought to be (the normative sciences). According to Kelsen, the science of law 
should restrict itself to describing the set of valid legal norms belonging to a certain 
(national or international) system of law. The description of the law – the ‘Is of 
Ought’ – should be purified from all empirical references, otherwise it would end 
up in contradictions. In Kelsen’s view, it is the research method that determines 
the object of research. So there is no ‘thing as such’, that exists independently 
from how we acquire knowledge of it. By using different methods, scholars 
produce different and incompatible bodies of knowledge and, as a consequence, 
different objects (e.g., the human body is not the same object for a doctor and an 
anthropologist). Jellinek does acknowledge that Is and Ought have to be 
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distinguished. He also recognizes that different scientific disciplines are using 
different methods and that therefore their outcomes cannot be exchanged. 
However, in his general theory of the state, he tries to establish connections 
between the social world and the legal world and the disciplines that study them. 
As a complex unity of differences, the state needs to be studied from both the 
social and the legal perspective. In his account of legal validity, Jellinek shows 
how the factual – as it manifests itself in an established practice, in a growing 
acceptance of certain norms, in mutual expectations and so on – can be 
normatively relevant. Conversely, the normative can have factual consequences, 
as in times of revolution, when the belief in the legitimacy of certain norms turns 
them into valid legal norms. Jellinek considers the state to be an object, a ‘thing in 
itself’, that has to be be studied from different perspectives.  
 Finally, contrary to Kelsen, Jellinek believes that interdisciplinary research is 
necessary in order to acquire a complete understanding of the state. What exactly 
is the nature of this interdisciplinary research? In terms of the dynamic model of 
interdisciplinarity,62 Jellinek’s theory seems to be perspectivist, since he stresses 
that the two sides of the state have to be studied separately from two different, 
incompatible, yet complementary perspectives. However, within the context of his 
general theory of the state, it is clear that the legal perspective has priority over the 
social perspective. From the legal perspective questions are raised that it cannot 
answer on its own and for which it needs assistance from the social perspective. In 
his account of legal validity, for instance, Jellinek draws on empirical (sociological 
                                                 
62 Taekema and Van Klink (n 4) 8-13. 
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and psychological) facts concerning the origin and development of habits and 
customs, but he does not engage in empirical research himself. Because of his 
focus on legal questions and legal research, the contribution of the social 
perspective can be characterized as predominantly auxiliary. In Kelsen’s pure 
theory of law there is no room for interdisciplinary exchange whatsoever. 
According to him, the science of law is fully autonomous in the sense that it uses 
its own methods and thereby it produces its own object of research. When 
describing the content of a legal system it does not need any help from other 
disciplines. Other disciplines (such as sociology, psychology, or economics) may 
be engaged with law too, but because they approach it in different ways, using the 
conceptual and methodological tools typical for the discipline at hand, they create 
their own object of knowledge. Therefore, insights acquired in one discipline 
cannot be transferred to another. Kelsen does acknowledge that the law functions 
in a social context, but this context is only relevant for its factual survival over time 
(by and large the legal norms have to be complied with in society), not for its 
normative existence as a legal system (or validity).  
 
5. Border Control  
 
In this final section, we will indicate how interdisciplinary research could be carried 
out when dealing with the problems these two theories are confronted with when 
controlling the borders between legal science and other disciplines. Although we 
do not favour a strict border control and deem exchanges between different 
disciplines potentially fruitful, we do think that every discipline needs some general 
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idea of its main concepts and the methods to be used in order to produce 
knowledge in a consistent, systematic and verifiable way.  
 With regard to both theories, the question can be raised whether they 
succeed in drawing the boundary between the science of law and other 
disciplines, rigorously in Kelsen and less strictly in Jellinek. When connections are 
made, as in Jellinek, how are they managed? In short, Kelsen’s ‘pure’ normative 
theory portrays law as an autonomous and self-referential system that possesses 
self-determination, the power to make the distinction between what is ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ of the legal world. One of the main theoretical challenges of today is to 
understand law outside of the confines of the nation state. Kelsen’s perspective 
has anticipated the systems-theory approach to law which allows you to 
understand the powerful expansion of law – usually dubbed ‘juridification’ – not 
only at the national level but also at the transnational and international level.63 
However, Kelsen fails in his attempt to purify the science of law from non-legal 
influences, because the acceptance of the basic norm is a subjective, political 
choice. By making this foundational choice, the legal scholar loses his or her 
status of neutral observer and becomes a participant of this particular political-
legal order. As a consequence, the two roles are conflated: the legal scholar 
becomes a participant in the legal system that is the subject of his or her scientific 
research. Moreover, by conflating these two roles, the potential critical stance 
toward the system is reduced to a mere consistency check. If the starting point of 
                                                 
63 For a description of current developments within the system theory approach to law, see Lyana Francot’s 
chapter in this volume. 
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legal research is by definition impure, it may lead to giving legal recognition to 
morally very dubious or corrupt sytems of norms (for instance, if one would 
describe the Nazi regime as a legal system). Yet, Kelsen’s strict objective 
conception of science is a matter of choice.64 Of course, Kelsen, has provided 
reasons for his choice to reduce legal science to a purely descriptive and context-
independent enterprise. Yet, these are not convincing, either on a factual or on a 
normative level. On the one hand, it can be disputed that legal facts can be 
established without normative evaluation. In his theory of legal interpretation, 
Kelsen acknowledges that in every application of the law, the legal official has to 
rely on non-legal values, since legal norms offer a ‘scheme of interpretation’ that 
allows for multiple meanings.65 However, for the same reason, it can be argued 
that a scientific description of the content of a legal system cannot be made 
without evaluating the law (as hermeneutic theories of interpretation claim; see for 
instance, Dworkin).66 On the other hand, the normativity of a political order is not 
simply a matter of subjective choice, since it is based on intersubjectively shared 
and contested understandings of the values involved. On the basis of this double 
criticism, and contrary to Kelsen, interdisciplinary research is helpful in two ways. 
Firstly, empirical research within the sociology of law and other social-scientific 
                                                 
64 Colin Hay, ‘Political Ontology’ in Robert E Goodin and Charles Tilly (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Contextual Political Analysis (Oxford University Press 2008) 78. 
65 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Mit einem Anhang: Das Problem der Gerechtigkeit (n 48) 94-95. See also 
Dreier (n 46) chapter 3. 
66 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1986). 
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disciplines is able to provide information, for instance on the character of the 
political order, the conflicts within the society, the distribution of power and the 
efficacy of law. Secondly, normative theory (in particular, legal and political theory 
and ethics) can provide insights into the rules and principles of the legal order, 
their justification, interpretation, and contestation from a philosophical point of 
view. Taken together, these disciplines are helpful in making a deliberate and well-
informed choice, particularly in the case of Kelsen, whether or not the legal scholar 
has to accept the basic norm of a given order.  
 Moreover, as Jellinek rightfully pointed out, the factual may affect the 
validity of legal norms. Kelsen acknowledges that the law’s effectiveness is a 
precondition for legal validity, but denies that the law’s efficacy is a reason for its 
validity. In case of customary law, the general acceptance of certain norms as 
legally binding offers a good reason for legal officials to recognize them. Kelsen 
would agree with this assumption, but he would still demand that the legal 
recognition of a custom requires the existence of a higher legal norm that 
authorizes its inclusion in the legal system. That does not seem to apply to cases 
of ‘negative’ custom (desuetudo), though. If legal norms are largely ignored in a 
certain society and no efforts are made to enforce these norms, it becomes very 
difficult to hold on to their legally binding character in practice. Kelsen 
acknowledges that norms can become obsolete when they are neglegted for an 
‘enduring period of time.’67 That means that certain facts, in this case the fact of a 
non-observance of rules for a longer period of time, decide upon the validity of law. 
                                                 
67 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (n 38) 119. 
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So, even in Kelsen’s theory, there is a necessary connection between 
effectiveness and validity which evidently brings back the haunting question of the 
relation between Is and Ought. 
 By contrast, Jellinek’s concept of the normative force of the factual 
connnects the spheres of Is and Ought. In his view, law is, and should be, 
receptive to the transformative power that stems from the underlying historical and 
societal forces driving change. For this reason legal science has to be able to cope 
with the emergence and development of law over time. According to Jellinek, 
however, these societal forces do not only shape the legal order, but they also 
presuppose themselves a political regime (‘the state’) in order to create a unified 
legal authority. But what does constitute the unity of legal authority? Jellinek’s 
approach lacks a convincing answer to this question, as Kelsen already argued. 
Jellinek fails to show how the two sides of the state can be integrated into one 
encompassing theory of the state. He is clear about the asymmtery between the 
state as a political actor and the state as a legal actor: the former is superior over 
the latter. This holds true, according to Jellinek, at least in a historical sense, since 
it is in the state’s capacity as a political actor that it constitutes the legal order, to 
which it subsequently may decide to subject itself voluntarily.68 However, this 
assessment begs the following questions: how are the two different sides of the 
state related to each other? And how can they be united in one scientific 
approach? Is it possible to conceive of the state as a political authority without 
presupposing its legal authority? In order to capture the complexity as well as the 
                                                 
68 According to Jellinek’s theory of self-limitation, see Lembcke (n 6) 98-102. 
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unity of the state’s authority, political science can be useful: it can help to identify, 
among other things, the various actors, arena and levels as much as the different 
modes of regulation that are involved and that need to be considered for a full 
picture of the state’s authority.69 This governmental approach also provides more 
insights into the relationship between (state) regulators and (interest) groups which 
plays an important role in Jellinek’s integrative approach to the social side, but 
which has not been conceptionalized adequately within the framework of his ‘two-
sided theory of the state.’ If one assumes, with Jellinek, that the acceptance of 
legal norms in society is not merely a pre-condition but a constitutive element of 
validity, it is important to be able to establish whether legal norms are indeed 
accepted by the norm addressees and to what extent. For that purpose, social-
scientific studies are relevant. Moreover, empirical research contributes to our 
understanding of the instruments with which the acceptance of legal norms can be 
enhanced. In addition, normative-philosopical research can help to reflect on the 
best or most legitimate legislative approach, either top-down as in the traditional 
instrumental approach or bottom-up as in the communicative or interactive 
approach.70  
 In conclusion, it seems that the two theories, each in their own way, try to 
secure the autonomy of the science of law, and are forced to take insights from 
                                                 
69 A rich field of research has been established in the wake of the discussion about ‘bringing the state back in’ 
(Peter B Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge 
University Press 1985)).   
70 These approaches are discussed in Nicole Zeegers, Willem Witteveen and Bart van Klink (eds), Social and 
Symbolic Effects of Legislation under the Rule of Law (The Edwin Mellem Press 2005). 
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other disciplines – including those from social-scientific and normative-
philosophical research – into account. In order to control the border, one has to, 
every now and then, cross the border. Standing on the other side, one will get a 
better view of how boundaries between the target discipline and neighbouring 
disciplines are established conventionally, and one may even be challenged to 
move and expand existing boundaries by importing insights from other disciplines.  
